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COMPETITION-THROUGH-INNOVATION: 
THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL STAGE
James D. Smith
The New School
ABSTRACT
This presentation describes a three-stage historical model developed as a
part of a Ph.D. dissertation analyzing competition between U.S. and
Japanese companies in electronics-related industries. The model is similar
to that described by Piore and Sabel in The Second Industrial Divide, but
companies under the third stage do not succeed by reacting quickly to
exogenous technological change but by repeatedly leapfrogging their
competitors through product and process innovation. This shifts the focus
from the mechanical production process to the collaborative innovation
process, which requires social systems to support collective learning.
Introduction
There has been much written about the economic changes brought on by global
competition and the emergence of new technologies including solid-state electronics,
micro-computers, biotechnology and the Internet. Various contributors attempting to
understand the nature of this change have introduced terms such as "flexible
specialization," "the new competition," "the knowledge worker," and more recently "the
new economy."1  While many observers have analyzed and attempted to characterize the
nature of these changes, few have attempted to provide fully developed models.
The exception is the model provided by Piore and Sabel.2  While this model was
useful when it was introduced in the early 1980s, the character of the economy has
changed considerably since then. As a result, there is a need for a newer, more up-to-date
model to serve as a guide to the new economy. Furthermore, there have been some
weaknesses uncovered in the Piore and Sabel model that need to be addressed. In
particular, this model: 1) does not provide an adequate explanation of the link between
technology and change; 2) fails to adequately distinguish between the behavior of
companies in traditional industries versus those in newly emerging technologies; and
3) characterizes all companies as reacting to exogenous technological change rather than
recognizing that some generate it endogenously through continuous innovation.
Within this context, I would like to outline a three-stage historical model that
emerged from a Ph. D. dissertation at the New School.3  This dissertation analyzed the
changing nature of competition between U.S. and Japanese companies in electronics-
related industries. The resulting model differs from the Piore and Sabel model in four
primary respects: 1) the driving force resulting in each industrial transformation is the
emergence of a superior competitive strategy not previously feasible due to limitations 
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in the scope of markets and the nature of technology; 2) various industrial segments are
affected differently because the emerging strategy cannot be fully applied in all
segments; 3) the dominant mode of competition in emerging sectors today is described as
Competition-Through-Innovation rather than flexible specialization; and 4) the dominant
structure in emerging sectors today is described as flexible integration rather than
flexible specialization.
Two Industrial Transformations
Although the model has three industrial stages, the focus of this discussion will be
primarily on the two industrial transformations that take place when one stage is replaced
by another. The first transformation to be focused upon took place in the mid-nineteenth
century when an economy made up of small firms utilizing craft technology gave way to
one dominated by large corporations. The second transformation began taking place in
this country in the early 1970s and is still taking place today. In this case an economy in
which large corporations sought to capture and hold markets by utilizing economies of
scale to undercut competitors prices is giving way to an economy in which companies or
networks of companies use product and process innovation to repeatedly leapfrog their
competitors, gaining temporary monopolies until one of their competitors does the same.
The Driving Force for Change
In this model, the driving force that brings about each industrial transformation is the
competitive superiority of a new competitive strategy made feasible by changes in
economic and technological circumstances. The competitive strategy that emerged out of
the first transformation in the mid-nineteenth century was competition-through-
economies-of-scale while the strategy that is emerging now is competition-through-
innovation. In each case, the change in competitive strategy results in changes in both
how economic value is produced and how firms and social institutions are structured.
Whereas competition-through-economies-of-scale required large corporations, mechan-
istic production systems, bureaucratic control and governmental regulation, compe-tition-
through-innovation requires networks, collaborative innovation systems, cooper-ation
among peers and facilitative support by institutions.
Competition-through-economies-of-scale is a strategy in which companies utilize
economies of scale to reduce the unit cost of standardized products or services and
compete based on price. Since increased market share means that fixed costs can be
distributed across a larger volume, companies adopting this strategy can achieve a
virtuous circle in which increased market share leads to decreased cost which, in turn,
leads to a further increase in market share, a further reduction in cost, etc. Once a
company achieves market dominance, that company can undercut the prices of
competitors seeking to penetrate the market.  When companies, beginning with the
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railroads in the mid-Nineteenth century, began adopting this competitive strategy,
economic behavior and structure began to change dramatically.4  Whereas firms under
craft production had little incentive to grow beyond a limited, optimum size, once
competition-through-economies-of-scale emerged, competition changed dramatically
with entrepreneurs such as Vanderbilt, Rockefeller and Carnegie racing their competitors
to capture markets and take advantage of economies of scale.5  This change in strategy
sometimes led to cutthroat price competition and other times to monopolies.6  It also led
to macroeconomic instability, Keynesian regulation and government regulation in
general.7
Competition-through-innovation is the strategy that in recent years has come to
dominate high technology industries such as electronics and computers. Under this
strategy, companies no longer seek to capture and hold markets for long periods of time
based on efficient production, but instead seek to repeatedly introduce new or essentially
new products, thereby achieving a series of temporary monopoly positions. Companies
such as Intel, for instance, do not compete by producing the same CPU chip for a long
period of time at the cheapest price, but instead compete by repeatedly racing their
competitors to introduce the most advanced (and most profitable) CPU chip. This
strategy has become dominant in industries where products are knowledge- rather than
resource-intensive, because international competition has made it difficult to profit from
the manufacture of such products once they become commodities.
Just as the previous shift to competition-through-economies-of-scale led to
dramatic changes in economic behavior and structure, so has adoption of competition-
through-innovation. Whereas corporations under competition-through-economies-of-
scale sought to integrate vertically so as to capture and hold markets, competitors under
competition-through-innovation have become increasingly dependent on collaborative
networks. Critical to the success of Silicon Valley computer firms relative to the
microcomputer firms on Route 128 in Boston, for instance, was the fact that Silicon
268
Valley firms, utilizing open systems and specializing in individual components, could
maintain a more rapid pace of innovation than could Boston firms which utilized
proprietary systems and therefore had to advance the technology of whole systems.
Enabling Mechanisms
Although each new competitive strategy represents an advance relative to the one
that went before, it can emerge only after certain changes take place in the scope of
markets and technology making it feasible.
A. Competition-Through-Economies-of-Scale:
1) Changes in market scope: In the mid-1800s, national markets resulted from the
development of railroad and telegraph networks extending across the nation and the
weakening of local and state barriers to trade. Competition-through-economies-of-scale
emerged first in industries such as the railroads, oil refining, chemicals and meat-
packing, where technological limitations on manufacturing did not have to be overcome.
2) Changes in technology: Prior to 1850, a forty-year effort by the federal
government to develop the technology for producing guns with interchangeable parts had
resulted in the development of precision machining capabilities. This meant that once
railroads made markets national in scope, entrepreneurs in newly emerging industries
producing such products as sewing machines, harvesting machines and bicycles could
hire machinists from the gun industry with the capabilities needed to advance
manufacturing methods toward mass production. These efforts, in turn, provided the
foundation for mass production to be fully realized with Henry Ford's assembly line.
B. Competition-Through-Innovation:
1) Changes in market scope: In the late 1900s, trade became international in scope
as international travel and communication became commonplace, national barriers to
trade were weakened and foreign competition was introduced into national markets. In
the 1970s, a first step toward competition-through-innovation was taken when Japanese
companies began using continuous improvement as a competitive strategy in the
automobile, consumer electronics and semiconductor industries.
2) Changes in Technology: Prior to 1970, a twenty year effort by the federal
government to obtain miniaturized components for defense and aerospace needs resulted
in the both the development of solid state electronics technology and collaborative
networks of companies and institutions engaged in collaborative innovation. Solid state
electronics resulted in the development of a whole range of products that were
knowledge- rather than resource-intensive. Since the cost of manufacture of these
products was generally small compared to the cost of research, development and design,
and since international competition made it difficult to profit from manufacture of
products that had become commodities, companies sought to maintain differentiation by
introducing new products at ever-faster rates.8  This trend was extended in the 1980s,
when the computer industry shifted from proprietary to open systems, allowing
innovation to take place within networks such as the one in Silicon Valley.9  Whereas
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previously companies were slow to innovate because they had to advance whole systems,
now innovation could proceed faster because companies could specialize in particular
component technologies. Coupled with the potential for start-up companies funded by
venture capitalists to advance the technology, this has brought competition-through-
innovation to a whole range of industries such as computers, electronics, biotechnology,
and the Internet.
Various Industrial Segments Are Affected Differently
Although each new competitive strategy is superior where it is applicable, it is not
fully applicable to all industries. As shown in figure 2, various segments are affected
differently by each industrial transformation, with some existing segments modifying
traditional strategies to fit the changed external environment and others (both existing
industries and newly emerging ones) fully applying the new competitive strategy.
Changes in How Value is Produced
The adoption of a new competitive strategy at the onset of a new industrial stage
results in fundamental changes in how economic value is produced. This, not only makes
a new value-creating process central to producing economic output, but results in a new
class of workers (those essential to the new process) gaining power, influence and
prestige at the expense of the previously most valued class.
A. Competition-Through-Economies-of-Scale: Whereas under craft production,
the most valued workers were those skilled craftsmen whose knowledge was critical to
the production process (the transformation of physical inputs into physical outputs),
under competition-through-economies-of-scale, blue-collar workers were less valued,
seen as contributing little more than physical labor. During this stage, white-collar
workers became the most valued class of workers by using their college-acquired
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technical and managerial knowledge to increase the efficiency of whole production,
distribution and marketing systems.
B. Competition-Through-Innovation: Today, in those industries in which compet-
ition-through-innovation is dominant, a third transformation process has been added —
the innovation process. Here, a third class of workers, frequently called "knowledge
workers" but more appropriately described as innovation workers, generates value, not by
using existing knowledge to make the production process more efficient, but by
combining a wealth of informal knowledge and experience held by many people and
institutions into a steady stream of product and process innovations. Since this innovation
process is a synthetic process involving the transformation of intellectual resources into
yet-to-be-discovered ideas for products and processes, it cannot be reduced to a sequence
of routine, bureaucratic steps like the production process. Instead, innovation requires
open communication and collaborative learning.
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Changes in Economic Structure
Just as the shift to a new competitive strategy results in a new process for
producing economic value, so does it result in structural changes to both firms and the
economy as a whole.
A. Competition-Through-Economies-of-Scale:
Before 1850 most firms were family-owned firms with fewer than 50 employees
and competition among these firms was rather benign. Companies generally had neither
the power nor the interest in crushing their competitors. Similarly, there was little need
for large administrative structures since owner-operators with the support of a few
foreman could generally supervise people directly.
Once the railroads began their rapid growth in the 1850s and 1860s, this began to
change dramatically. On the one hand, there was the Pennsylvania Railroad, which grew
from 4,000 employees in 1850 to 30,000 employees by 1865 (making it the largest
company in the world). In addition, there were companies like the New York Central
Railroad, which resulted from Cornelius Vanderbilt's efforts in consolidating 13 separate
railroads and acquiring several others. As railroads manipulated prices for shippers,
engaged in conspiracies and fought price wars to gain dominance over one another,
competition no longer resembled the ideal market described by theoretical economics but
instead came to be dominated by very large and powerful competitors, all using their
power and whatever tactics they could to crush their competitors.
In the decades that followed, other industries were similarly transformed. In the 1870s
and 1880s, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie fought to gain control of oil and
steel markets. By 1870, Rockefeller had gained control of 90% of the oil refineries in the
country and by 1901, Carnegie had sold his steel company to J.P. Morgan, resulting in
U.S. Steel, the world's first billion-dollar corporation. Other industries including
electricity generation, cigarettes, meat-packing, and telephones also came to be
dominated by oligopolies. Finally, in the 1890s, when a depression caused destructive
price wars in other industries that still had numerous competitors, a merger movement
was triggered. The result was that by 1904, what had been 5,000 independent firms was
reduced to 300 trusts.
B. Competition-Through-Innovation:
Prior to the 1970s, the structure of American industry continued to be dominated
by large, vertically-integrated corporations, even in industries such as computers and
consumer electronics. Even though innovation had become commonplace in these
industries, nevertheless, companies such as RCA, Philco and Motorola continued to
assume that whatever innovative products they developed would make it to market ahead
of competitors' products. Thus it came as a shock to these companies when Japanese
competitors began to both rapidly penetrate these markets with high quality, low cost
alternatives and in many cases actually introduce new products ahead of their American
competitors. As it turned out, the primary reason that the Japanese were able to bring
innovations such as transistor radios, Quasar Color TV's, and VCRs to market more
quickly was that they had circumvented the barriers of bureaucracy by using teams to
jointly develop easily-manufactured products instead of allowing designers in one
department to create designs that ignored potential manufacturing difficulties. Similarly,
when Japanese companies learned to produce higher quality DRAM memory chips faster
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than their American competitors, it again raised questions about the difficulties of
achieving rapid innovation and learning in a bureaucratic environment.
This question was clearly answered a few years later when individual computer
companies on Route 128 in Boston were unable to keep up with the pace of innovation
set by a network of companies producing computers in the Silicon Valley. Because each
Boston company was responsible for advancing the technology of an entire proprietary
system, while each Silicon Valley company had only to advance the technology of a
particular component within an open system, the Boston companies simply could not
keep up.10   Since that time, the open systems approach utilized by Silicon Valley
companies has repeatedly shown itself to be superior in terms of maintaining the most
rapid pace of innovation.
Notes
